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Conﬁdentiality constraints often preclude the release of disaggregate data about individuals, which limits the types and accuracy
of the results of geographical health analyses that could be done. Access to individually geocoded (disaggregate) data often involves
lengthy and cumbersome procedures through review boards and committees for approval (and sometimes is not possible). More-
over, current data conﬁdentiality-preserving solutions compatible with ﬁne-level spatial analyses either lack ﬂexibility or yield less
than optimal results (because of conﬁdentiality-preserving changes they introduce to disaggregate data), or both. In this paper, we
present a simulation case study to illustrate how some analyses cannot be (or will suﬀer if) done on aggregate data. We then quickly
review some existing data conﬁdentiality-preserving techniques, and move on to explore a solution based on software agents with
the potential of providing ﬂexible, controlled (software-only) access to unmodiﬁed conﬁdential disaggregate data and returning only
results that do not expose any person-identiﬁable details. The solution is thus appropriate for micro-scale geographical analyses
where no person-identiﬁable details are required in the ﬁnal results (i.e., only aggregate results are needed). Our proposed software
agent technique also enables post-coordinated analyses to be designed and carried out on the conﬁdential database(s), as needed,
compared to a more conventional solution based on the Web Services model that would only support a rigid, pre-coordinated
(pre-determined) and rather limited set of analyses. The paper also provides an exploratory discussion of mobility, security, and
trust issues associated with software agents, as well as possible directions/solutions to address these issues, including the use of vir-
tual organizations. Successful partnerships between stakeholder organizations, proper collaboration agreements, clear policies, and
unambiguous interpretations of laws and regulations are also much needed to support and ensure the success of any technological
solution.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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gerard-rushton@uiowa.edu (G. Rushton).types and accuracy of the results of geographical health
analyses that could be done [1]. Individual agencies
holding micro-data (small population/individual health
and environmental data) often impose restrictions on
the level of geography that can be reported. In the US,
for example, the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS—http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/) requires that for
all micro-data that are released outside of NCHS,
geographic identiﬁcation must be deleted for all areas
below the State level, which contain fewer than some
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logical analysis based on choropleth mapping and the
analysis of aggregate data for administrative areas has
been heavily criticized. It is increasingly becoming clear
in the ﬁeld of public health that individual-level health
information aggregated to pre-existing political or other
administrative areas to protect individual privacy often
destroys information needed for geographical analyses
making it impossible to address many important public
health concerns, e.g., accident risk of particular environ-
ments, hazards of living close to hazardous waste sites,
exposure risk from lead associated with urban highways,
etc. Such concerns can only be addressed using micro-
data. The lack of spatially-disaggregate data on health-
care utilization and clinical activity also limits the types
and power of healthcare delivery studies that can be car-
ried out [2–5].
Using aggregated data instead of address-level data
(when the latter is required) produces what Jacquez [6]
calls ‘‘spatial uncertainty.’’ Moreover, using area cent-
roids instead of exact locations can yield misleading re-
sults [6]. According to Armstrong et al. [5], when data
are spatially aggregated to large areas, the ability of
researchers to detect disease clusters or to investigate
suspected relationships between environmental expo-
sures and disease events is aﬀected in four ways:
(1) Absolute and relative locations within the geo-
graphical extent of each area are unobservable
making it impossible to perform tests of clustering,
except for those designed to operate speciﬁcally on
data aggregated to areas;
(2) The eﬀect of the geographic scale of the aggrega-
tion with respect to the geographic scale of the
clusters means that the aggregation level used in
an analysis limits the size of clusters that could
be detected;
(3) The shape and placement of aggregation areas in
relation to the real-world distribution of the
disease or clusters under study, e.g., when a disease
cluster straddles two or more aggregation
areas, may result in ambiguous or negative results;
and
(4) Accurate analyses are only possible when health
data are spatially encoded to the boundaries of
areas with common levels of environmental expo-
sure, which is usually not the case since exposure
assessment data are generally collected for diﬀer-
ent areas than health and demographic data.
The next section presents a simulation model to illus-
trate how some public health analyses cannot be (or will
greatly suﬀer if) done on aggregate data, and to provide
some justiﬁcation for the necessity of new data conﬁden-
tiality-preserving approaches like the software agents
solution that we are proposing later in this paper.2. The problem of identifying areas of high disease risk
from privacy protected geocodes on cases of disease: a
simulation case study
As mentioned above, limiting the accuracy of geo-
codes for the purposes of privacy protection degrades
the ability to identify areas of high disease risk. Evidence
is provided in Figs. 1 and 2, which, although based on
simulated disease cases, illustrate the degrading eﬀect
of substituting for individually identiﬁable disease cases
and spatially disaggregated population data—Figs. 1B
and C, spatially aggregated disease and population
data—Figs. 2B and C. A hypothetical spatial pattern
of relative risk surrounding a hypothetical, high-disease
risk rural location is shown in Fig. 1A.
Disease risk decreases exponentially with increasing
distance from a given location and reaches a base rate
of one at a given distance from the site of maximum risk:
RRi ¼ RRmax expðp  xiÞ for xi 6 Dlag
where RRi is the relative risk at location i; RRmax is the
relative risk at the site of greatest relative risk; p is a
scale factor that aﬀects the decline rate of relative
risk with distance; xi is the distance between location i
and the location of maximum risk; Dlag is the distance
from the site of greatest risk at which the relative risk
is one.
The individual cases (Fig. 1B) constitute 2000 cases
drawn at random from the product of population and
relative risk as computed from the equation above
and illustrated in the hypothetical relative risk surface
shown in Fig. 1A for which RRmax = 5 and Dlag = 10
miles. An estimated relative risk surface is produced
(Fig. 1D) by placing a one-mile grid on the two data
layers of Figs. 1B and C and, at each grid intersec-
tion, estimating the relative risk as the density of cases
to population relative to a region-wide rate in ﬁve-
mile radius kernels. Note the close resemblance be-
tween the spatial pattern of risk in Fig. 1D and the
hypothetical pattern of Fig. 1A from which the 2000
simulated cases in Fig. 1B were produced. In contrast,
in Fig. 2B the same simulated cases have been aggre-
gated into census tracts—a common procedure used
by many cancer registries in the United States to pro-
tect patient privacy when releasing cancer incidence
case totals. Similarly, the same population data as in
Fig. 1C are shown in Fig. 2C as aggregated totals
for census tracts. An estimated relative risk surface
(Fig. 2D) is produced from the overlay of the data
layers in Figs. 2B and C using the same method that
produced Fig. 1D. Note in this case, however, that,
unlike the close resemblance of Fig. 1D with
Fig. 1A, the pattern in Fig. 2D does not have a close
resemblance with Fig. 1A. The inability to produce
the correct spatial pattern of risk in Fig. 2D is a con-
sequence of the spatial aggregation of the two data
Fig. 1. Estimating relative risk from individual case data and disaggregated population data.
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caused by using spatially aggregated disease case data
to protect the privacy of individuals.The scenario of this case study is realistic in the
sense that it uses real population data. Fig. 2C shows
US Census 2000 population counts for census tracts in
Fig. 2. Estimating relative risk from spatially aggregated case (tract) data and census tract population data.
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Johnson), total population 342,864. The population
data in Fig. 1C are based on the US Census popula-
tion totals for census blocks in the four county area
disaggregated to a level of approximately 90 m2 areas
by the Geographic Information Science and Technolo-
gy group at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using
intelligent spatial interpolation methods (for details
see Report # 2 at http://www.uiowa.edu/~gishlth/
UIORNL/).3. Current data conﬁdentiality-preserving solutions
Traditional privacy preserving techniques like pseud-
onymization, which might be appropriate in genomic
medicine research [7], for example, are not suitable for
use in micro-scale geographical analyses. The reason
pseudonymization is not suitable for disaggregate spa-
tial analyses is that it changes a crucial piece of per-
son-identiﬁable details required for such analyses: the
individuals point address/Zip Code or postcode.
164 M.N. Kamel Boulos et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 160–170For spatial studies, many solutions have been devised
in an attempt to preserve data conﬁdentiality while still
enabling various degrees of ﬁne-level analyses and
acceptable results.
These solutions involve:
(1) The use of statistical and epidemiological methods
to mask the geographic location of data in a way
that can still permit meaningful analysis, e.g., spe-
cial types of spatial and temporal aggregation of
data; and
(2) The creation of secure (networked) environments
with limited and multiple levels of access (to conﬁ-
dential data) in which public health researchers
can be carefully monitored to ensure protection
of individual and household conﬁdentiality.
These solutions are discussed below. They either lack
ﬂexibility or yield less than optimal results (because of
conﬁdentiality-preserving changes they introduce to dis-
aggregate data), or both.
3.1. Statistical and epidemiological methods
Armstrong et al. [5] describe diﬀerent promising types
of geographical masks to encode the geography of
health records. These masks not only preserve the conﬁ-
dentiality of individual health records, but also preserve,
to the maximum degree possible, the geographic proper-
ties of the data, thus permitting the investigation of
questions that can be validly answered only with some
(adequate) knowledge about the location of health
events.
The geographic coordinates of data collected at dis-
crete locations can be subjected to a family of aﬃne
point transformations that move these locations deter-
ministically to a new set of locations. Another technique
is random perturbation, in which each point is displaced
(within the range of a constant maximum magnitude of
displacement) by a randomly determined amount, and
in a randomly determined direction, speciﬁc to its origi-
nal location. A third class of geographic masks is aggre-
gation. Areal aggregation involves enumerating the total
that exists within a region. Point aggregation uses a sin-
gle, surrogate location to represent the location of sever-
al individual-level events. In the latter case, regions
could be represented by their geographic centroids, or
surrogate locations could be computed that are opti-
mized regarding some deﬁned relationship to the origi-
nal locations (location–allocation methods). Other
point aggregation methods include microaggregation
and blurring. It is also possible to aggregate for non-
conterminous ‘‘regions’’ of interest like releasing health
data for all areas within a given distance of a speciﬁed
hazard, e.g., all childrens accidents within 20 m of stop
signs. Another possible approach to limiting disclosureis to remove all explicit geographic identiﬁers from the
health record and replace them with contextual informa-
tion of speciﬁc interest to the data user [5].
The best approach will depend on the purpose of the
data user as well as the degree of disclosure risk that the
data custodian wishes to tolerate. Preliminary research
suggests that random perturbation of data, up to some
limit, is superior to aﬃne and aggregation masks for
many analytical purposes [5].
Areal aggregation is perhaps the most commonly
adopted approach among those suggested by Armstrong
et al. [5]. Health organizations are always looking for
ﬁner levels of boundary geography to aggregate their
data to. For example, in the US, organizations might
aggregate their data at census tract level instead of coun-
ty level. (A US census tract is a small statistical subdivi-
sion of a county designed to be relatively homogenous
with respect to demographics, socio-economic charac-
teristics, and living conditions, and to contain between
1500 and 8000 residents.)
3.2. Secure networks with multiple access levels
Croner [8] describes a solution to data conﬁdentiality
problems consisting of multiple levels of access to data
classiﬁed according to sensitivity, ranging from conﬁ-
dential/protected data to public/open access data
according to user credentials. Access to conﬁdential data
can be accommodated for qualiﬁed users in secure Intra-
net or Internet settings.
The US NCI GIS for Health (National Cancer Insti-
tute Geographic Information System for Health—GIS-
H) developed as part of the Long Island Breast Cancer
Study Project (LIBCSP) provides a good example of a
successful implementation of multiple levels of data ac-
cess according to user credentials. A ‘‘Researchers’’ area
of the LIBCSP Web site provides applications necessary
for access and use of non-public resources that are sub-
ject to privacy and licensing restrictions (http://
www.healthgis-li.com/researchers/researchers.htm). On
the other hand, data, information, maps and software
that have been approved for public dissemination are
available to anyone.
Similarly, the Washington State Health Departments
online Epidemiologic Query and Mapping System
(EpiQMS—http://epiqms.doh.wa.gov/) incorporates
three levels of security to accommodate citizens, public
health and medical practitioners, and public health
agency investigators access to state and regional health
data. This security model allows diﬀerent levels of access
to the data depending on the likelihood that an individ-
uals privacy could be compromised [8].
Also noteworthy is NCHS in-house Research Data
Center [9]. This is a secure physical environment where
external researchers can (physically) work with more de-
tailed data sets, but not remove the data sets from the
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bersome and lacks ﬂexibility (e.g., requires researchers
to travel to the data center).Fig. 3. An essential agent architecture.4. A software agent-based data conﬁdentiality-preserving
solution for micro-data geographical analyses
It is useful to think of two broad categories of spatial
analyses that might be carried out:
(1) Analyses within an original data repository (repos-
itory with person-identiﬁable data), e.g., a cancer
registry where analysis might be done using the lat-
itude-longitude coordinate for the residential
address of the cancer patient; and
(2) Analyses using public domain data. Such data
would ﬁrst need to be aggregated before making
them accessible to researchers.
Over the past several years, completion of protocols
for projects involving research on original data reposito-
ries (like cancer registry data) for Human Subject Insti-
tutional Review Boards (IRBs) and research ethics
committees has been diﬃcult and time-consuming [10].
As a result, researchers have been thinking more
about designing software that could be sent to the origi-
nal data repository, so the analysis could be done inside
the original data repository and then a summary aggre-
gate report sent back to the researcher, rather than try-
ing to obtain IRB approvals so that the data custodian
can send data to the investigator, or develop studies
where data with identiﬁers would need to be sent by
the data repository to the researcher.
Back in 1999, Armstrong et al. [5] mentioned one
such solution based on software agents. If an agent were
designed to support the analysis of public health data,
users would not be required to have access to conﬁden-
tial health records. Rather, they would submit a request
to an intelligent analysis agent that would assess the re-
quest, and if found appropriate, would complete the
analysis and return a result to the data user without
exposing any individual-level health data.
It is noteworthy that the Health System Resident
Component (HSRC), part of RODS, the Real-time Out-
break and Disease Surveillance system (http://
www.health.pitt.edu/rods/), is based on ‘‘similar’’ con-
cepts. HSRC is located within the ﬁrewall of a health
system (e.g., a participating hospital), and its purpose
is to provide RODS with additional public health sur-
veillance functions that would not be possible if it were
located outside of the ﬁrewall due to restrictions on the
release of identiﬁable clinical data. It functions as a case
detector in a distributed public health surveillance
scheme linking laboratory and radiology data to in-
crease the speciﬁcity of case detection. HSRC removesidentiﬁable information before transmitting any data
to RODS servers (outside the health systems ﬁrewall)
[11].
In addition to better protection of privacy, conduct-
ing the analysis in the original data repository provides
the ability to aggregate and disaggregate data, and to ex-
plore whether spatial relationships are persistent at dif-
ferent spatial scales.5. On software agents
The concept of software agents can be traced back to
artiﬁcial intelligence and discrete event simulation re-
search in the early-mid 1980s and has now grown into a
major research topic drawing in addition on sources in
economics, game theory, and social science. Although a
range of attributes are variously ascribed to agents [12],
there is consensus that in essence an agent is (Fig. 3).
reactive: it responds to changes in its environment;
pro-active: it generates and attempts to achieve goals;
social: it has the capacity to interact with other agents
and even to cooperate.
In software engineering terms, agents are proposed as
the next level of abstraction up from objects [13], and in-
deed it is much more straightforward to translate soft-
ware requirements into agent behaviors than it is to
object methods, but it is still yet early days for the tech-
nology. Perhaps more important is the principle that a
software agent be able to cope with a changing environ-
ment—typically one that the designer did not foresee.
Consequently high-level declarative programming tech-
niques are often adopted that describe what is to be
achieved but not how to achieve it. Examples of these
approaches are logic programming—for example, using
Prolog—or choosing what action to take based on how
much closer it takes the agent to satisfying some condi-
tion—an adaptation of the idea of utility maximization
from economics. In this way, choosing what to do—ac-
tion selection—is delegated to the software and the
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able, rather than being ﬁxed by a programmer days,
weeks or even years previously, when (s)he can only
guess at the environment in which the software will be
operating. This underlines a further key aspect, that of
autonomy: a software agent normally only does what it
is asked to do if it ﬁts with its goals and its agenda.
Agent attributes that are present in some systems but
not all are mobility, veracity, benevolence, rationality,
and adaptability (typically through learning). This might
all sound rather alarming when, for safety-critical sce-
narios, there is a tendency to want more control over
software actions, not less, but this should be weighed
against the potential advantages, as outlined above, aris-
ing from a software agent being in a position to choose
an action appropriate to the circumstance rather than
the programmer choosing something inappropriate in
ignorance of the circumstance.
Software agents carry with them their own new secu-
rity risks, which must be properly addressed. Mecha-
nisms need to be introduced, for example, to digitally
sign, authenticate and authorize genuine agents and
their transactions, and prevent ‘‘Trojan horse’’ like at-
tacks by fake or rogue agents [14].
Clearly, software agents are potentially very complex
and, at ﬁrst sight, harder to validate against safety and
security requirements. But their very high-level nature
(in which requirements are closely related to agent
behaviors, and behavior can be evaluated against insti-
tutional norms) actually oﬀers the opportunity to sim-
plify matters: we will return to these issues in the next
section.6. Mobility, security, trust issues, and solutions
Mobile programs are technically very challenging to
realize, although the development of the Java Virtual
Machine (JVM [15]), the principle of write-once run-
anywhere, the widespread deployment of Java plat-
forms (via browsers), the development of suitable tool-
kits [16,17] and most important of all, the
sophistication of the Java security model [18,19] have
all considerably eased the situation. There are two cat-
egories of mobile scenario: (i) where the software is on
a mobile device, such as a laptop or PDA and (ii)
where the software actually suspends execution on
one machine and is transferred across a network and
starts execution again on a second machine. Each oﬀers
their own security challenges and potential exploits (see
discussion below), so much so that, because of the
inadequacy of currently implemented security models,
it is in general better to replace mobility by communi-
cation, where possible.
However, the scenario under consideration here spec-
iﬁes that the data resources contain personal identiﬁca-tion information that may not be exported from the
security domain. If we look at this problem from the
viewpoint of the physical world, it is like permitting a
person to enter a reading room, process some of the re-
cords held there, and exit with the results as long as they
contain only aggregated data (cf. NCHS Research Data
Center [9]). Naturally, the person may not enter into
any communication with outside parties while in the
reading room (no mobile phones!). Analogously, a mo-
bile agent solution sees the creation of an agent at Orga-
nization 1, loading it with a description of the task to be
completed, transferring it to Organization 2, where the
data are located, letting it compute the results and leav-
ing. Unfortunately, this is a case in which the virtual
world of software and networks is more subtle and dif-
ﬁcult to police than the physical world: security checks
are in general much harder to enforce and breaches less
easy to detect.
Let us summarize the problems of admitting external
code to a site to be secured, such as Organization 2 in
the scenario above:
(1) The external code is vulnerable to interference by
the host: how can the integrity of the external code
be guaranteed?
(2) The host is vulnerable to interference by the exter-
nal code: how can the behavior of the external
code be constrained without hopelessly compro-
mising usability?
(3) Authentication procedures oﬀer only limited secu-
rity: as with any cryptography, it is only as secure
as the next advance in code-breaking.
(4) Authorization procedures are in general poorly
understood and implementation is even worse:
the Java security model incorporating stack
inspection (Java 2.4) is pretty much state of the
art.
(5) Firewalls can isolate the external code, but this
may prevent legitimate and even necessary com-
munication: how can (almost certainly encrypted)
communications be checked for breaches of
security?
(6) The operations on the secure data and the
aggregate results may either or both constitute
intellectual property of the organization owning
the agent and so may not be revealed to the
organization hosting the data: how can it be
ensured that the results do not identify any
individuals?
We propose that the solution to all these problems is
the application of virtual institutions. Since this concept
is relatively new, we oﬀer a few key references and a
brief synopsis. In fact, overlapping areas of concern
are evoked by three terms used for research in this area:
virtual institutions [20,21], virtual organizations (VOs)
Fig. 4. Security scenarios for mobile agents.
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there are emergent institutions that derive from social
interactions and the evolution of social norms, in con-
trast to legal institutions, that may formalize social insti-
tutions—like marriage—or may be created by a
legislature as a means to governance—like drug approv-
al processes. We do not intend to be contentious, but in
the cause of brevity, we warn the reader that it is more
than likely that our description of these terms and their
relationships would not satisfy all researchers into these
issues. Virtual institution research largely focuses on
either the emergence or the speciﬁcation (and veriﬁca-
tion) of norm-based systems—where a norm2 may cap-
ture participants required behavior with varying
degrees of precision, from the abstract, through rules
to the level of protocols. As such, institutions may be de-
ﬁned independent of the actors that participate in
them—thus they can be viewed as classes—and then
instantiated—like objects—to meet a particular need;
see for example [24]. At the other end of the spectrum,
coalitions are normally the product of the participants
negotiation over how to cooperate to satisfy common
goals that are individually unachievable. In between
there are virtual organizations that are informed partial-
ly by both the other two, in that the entities may not be
individual actors, but parts of organizations and thus
bound by organizational (institutional) constraints.
The situation presented in this paper sits within the
framework of the legal institution, since actions are con-
strained by legal requirements, both from the govern-
ment and the national health agency, as well as from
the organization in which the individual works who is
carrying out the analysis. Let us now focus on the prob-
lem and the scenarios depicted in Fig. 4.
Scenario 1. Agent 1 transfers to Organization A,
computes its results and leaves. Satisfactory, apart
from the caveats above; in particular, agent 1 possi-
bly has access to all the data in store 1, not just the
data it needs.
Scenario 2. Agent 2 wants to combine information
held in Organization A and Organization B, so it
transfers to A, computes (aggregate) results, transfers
to B and computes its ﬁnal results. The constraint
here is that because only aggregate data can be
exported, it is diﬃcult to carry out meaningful analy-
ses using multiple data sources.1 For current activity in any of these areas, see also any of the
proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), ACM Press.
2 Our use of the term norm has much in common with economics
and with legal theory and refers to the relatively unfamiliar deﬁnition
as ‘‘a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group
and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable
behavior’’.Scenario 3. Agent 3 wants to do the same as Agent 2
but without the aggregation constraint, so it requests
the creation of a virtual organization whose data
store provides access only to the data needed from
each source, transfers to it, computes its results and
leaves. The virtual organization is destroyed—al-
though a record of its creation and parameters should
be preserved in the provenance information of the
computed results (for future reconstruction and
reproduction of results).
The immediate concern with scenario 3 is that data
appear to be exported from both Organizations A and
B. It is here that the properties of the virtual world help
us, rather than the opposite, because although it is
sometimes desirable, it is not necessary for logical secu-
rity domains to coincide with physical boundaries. Con-
sider, for example, an employee working from home via
a virtual enterprise network (VEP): this is an extrusion
of the organizations security domain to include the
employees home PC. In a similar way, a virtual organi-
zation can be synthesized to combine access to speciﬁed
resources in each constituent organization—some of
which might themselves be virtual organizations—thus
each data source remains within the security domain
of its respective host organization.
The beneﬁts of using a virtual organization are that
(i) the host organization is insulated against the incom-
ing agent and (ii) leakage is minimized by limiting access
to the necessary data, thus addressing problems 2 and 4
above. Use of a VO also improves the situation with re-
spect to problem 6, since the regulations governing the
VO may be published and veriﬁed, so demonstrating
that information brought into the VO or created in the
VO remains the property of the agent (or its owner).
Finally, a VO permits the assembly of disaggregated
data from a range of sources, but in a secure environ-
ment that maintains the security policy of the owning
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ble in the peripatetic mobile agent setting.
This leaves outstanding the problems of agent vul-
nerability (problem 1), which is to a certain extent also
addressed by the publication and veriﬁcation of the
VO regulations, authentication (problem 3), which is
just a case of using the latest oﬀ-the-shelf technology,
and secure communications that do not break identiﬁ-
cation policy (problem 5). Both 1 and 5 can be re-
solved by the use of proxies, that is, instead of the
agent transferring itself into the virtual organization,
a representative or proxy agent is created on its behalf
to carry out actions within the VO. Consequently, the
agent is not vulnerable to the environment of the VO,
while the proxy, whose range of actions are con-
strained by the VOs regulations, can only do what
the VO permits it, for example, in terms of what data
may be communicated to the agent. Meanwhile the
agent, being outside the VO is free to communicate
as it will.
Thus far, we have presented technical solutions to
technical problems (1–5). Problem 6 is a mixture of
the technical and the social in that for multi-agent sys-
tems to be deployed there must be suﬃcient trust in
their observing the privacy norms that are required.
Trust in computational systems is a delicate issue and
has been the subject of research, especially within the
emergent institution community, for a number of
years. However, there are many aspects to trust which
can all too easily be conﬂated and hence confused.
Again, we do not want to be contentious, but inevita-
bly a brief outline will miss the nuances of a fuller
treatment. Broadly, trust, in the scenario under discus-
sion here, might be seen from two perspectives: (i) the
external observer who wishes to be assured that priva-
cy legislation—and the more detailed operational guar-
antees that represent the implementation of that
legislation—shall be adhered to3 and (ii) inter-agent
trust, where research is focusing on modeling reputa-
tion [25] and social networks [26]. In case (i) trust is
a function of the correctness of the institution and
techniques are starting to appear to capture and to ver-
ify adherence to norms (rules and protocols), while still
retaining the ﬂexibility of multi-agent systems [27–29].
At the present time, case (ii) is not so directly relevant
to our scenario, but may yet become so.
Has the privacy problem for micro analyses actually
been ‘‘solved’’ or has it just been pushed into a diﬀerent
place? Who or what will be responsible for the creation
of the virtual organization? Here are some arguments
and answers (with reference to the two organization
scenario):3 In traditional software systems this might be called safety-critical
analysis.• The VO will be deﬁned and veriﬁed by each of the
physical organizations to ensure that it implements
their security policy—or none will be created if the
policies are irreconcilable.
• The future for (semantic) Web services, agents and
organizations that we envision has machine-readable
descriptions of organizations expressed in an appro-
priate logical formalism that programs can reason
about and manipulate, so that the creation of the
VO and its validation can be at least semi-automatic,
if not fully.
• Thus, existing physical organizations will, in the ﬁrst
case be responsible for codifying their policies and
getting them validated and possibly certiﬁed by exter-
nal agencies.
• However, the VO will be the product of the physical
organizations requirements and in that way they will
retain control and responsibility for what takes place.
In conclusion, the reader will see that we have come
full circle back to a communication-based solution,
but it was only the exploration of the requirements, stat-
ed in mobile agent terms, and the security issues that
transpired, that stimulated the identiﬁcation of the con-
cepts put forward. Although the solution outlined does
not involve the use of mobile agents, indeed it has
sought to avoid them, there is still potential for a solu-
tion using mobile agents. At the present time however,
the primary obstacle is that no language run-time cur-
rently available implements the necessary security mech-
anism (Java and .NET included). A detailed analysis of
these issues, and a scenario like that discussed here, can
be found in [30].7. Software agents vs. web services
Our proposed software agent technique ensures max-
imum ﬂexibility in that it enables post-coordinated anal-
yses to be designed and carried on the conﬁdential
database(s), as needed. By comparison, an alternative
solution based on the Web Services model [31] (and
standard secured network communication), though
potentially much easier to ensure its security, would be
less ﬂexible. In such an alternative solution, the data
analysis component (Web Service) would reside perma-
nently on the network/server where the conﬁdential data
are stored. It would receive, authenticate, and validate
external requests, which must use the components
scripting language to describe the required analyses. If
an analysis cannot be described using the components
scripting language then it cannot be executed (less ﬂexi-
ble, pre-coordinated solution). Moreover, though Web
Services can be nested, problems again might occur
when an analysis involves conﬁdential data from two
diﬀerent servers/networks.
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The development, publication and strict enforcement
of appropriate, unambiguous policies, laws and regula-
tions will continue to be important in regulating health
and healthcare research involving person-identiﬁable
data [8,32]. Technological solutions, including our pro-
posed software agents techniques, will not completely
solve all legal complexities surrounding the non-treat-
ment use of person-identiﬁable data and individual data
conﬁdentiality [10,33,34] (they might even introduce with
them new legal concerns). These legal aspects should be
re-examined and clariﬁed whenever any new solution is
introduced.
Establishing and maintaining successful partnerships
between relevant stakeholder organizations, and having
proper (written) collaboration agreements and clear
data sharing/research policies [34] are two other crucial
ingredients that must be present to enable smooth
agent transactions between the diﬀerent organizations
sharing data and agents. Such partnerships and
agreements are essential in establishing an environment
of trust where these agents, their owners and data
custodians can work and collaborate securely and
productively.9. Conclusions
Conﬁdentiality constraints often preclude the release
of disaggregate data about individuals, which limits the
types and accuracy of the results of geographical health
analyses that could be done. We presented a simulation
case study to show how by limiting the accuracy of geo-
codes for the purposes of privacy protection, the ability
to identify areas of high disease risk is degraded. The
simulation hypothesized a relationship between a high-
disease risk source and a population health eﬀect. A test
was done for association with individually geocoded
data and an equivalent test for aggregated geocoded
data (from the same simulated data). The high-disease
risk source-eﬀect association was found with the individ-
ually coded but not with the aggregated data.
Access to individually geocoded (disaggregate) data
often involves lengthy and cumbersome procedures
through review boards and committees for approval
(and sometimes is not possible). Moreover, current data
conﬁdentiality-preserving solutions compatible with
ﬁne-level spatial analyses either lack ﬂexibility or yield
less than optimal results (because of conﬁdentiality-pre-
serving changes they introduce to disaggregate data), or
both. This is where our proposed software agents solu-
tion can come in to help, providing ﬂexible, controlled
(software-only) access to unmodiﬁed conﬁdential disag-gregate data, and returning only results that do not
expose any person-identiﬁable details.
Software agents, including their mobile variety, can
act on behalf of an investigator or group of researchers
who have a legitimate data mining/analysis request,
moving as required between networks and servers where
conﬁdential data are stored, or creating secure virtual
organizations where conﬁdential data can be pooled
from multiple sources, performing the required data
mining and analysis functions on the spot, and returning
only useful aggregate results and conclusions without
any individual-identiﬁable details to the researcher or
group they are representing.
Our proposed software agent technique also enables
post-coordinated analyses to be designed and carried
out on the conﬁdential database(s), as needed, com-
pared to a more conventional solution based on the
Web Services model that would only support a ﬁxed,
pre-coordinated (pre-determined) and rather limited
set of analyses.
However, the use of software agents in this kind of
applications is not as simple as it might sound, and also
carries with it its own new security risks, which must be
properly addressed. Mechanisms need to be introduced,
for example, to digitally sign and authenticate genuine
agents and their transactions, and prevent ‘‘Trojan
horse’’ like attacks by fake or rogue agents. We have
provided an exploratory discussion of mobility, security
and trust issues associated with software agents, as well
as possible directions/solutions to address these issues,
including the use of virtual organizations.
Successful partnerships between stakeholder organi-
zations, collaboration agreements, clear policies, and
unambiguous interpretations (and, when necessary, revi-
sions) of laws and regulations are also much needed to
support and ensure the success of any technological
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